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Elaborating the Conceptual Difference between 
Conventions and Institutions 
Rainer Diaz-Bone ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Ausarbeitung der konzeptionellen Differenz von Institution und 
Konvention«. The article elaborates the conceptual difference between two core 
concepts of the French approach of economics of convention (EC), namely con-
vention and institution. It is argued that modern institutionalisms and neo-
institutionalisms need to delimit the meaning of the notion institution as EC 
does. Then it is possible to work out the relations of institutions and other 
forms of cultural or structural resources. A proposal for such an elaboration is 
done by differing four perceived situations for institutional analysis. This elabo-
ration could be used to enhance the explanatory capabilities of EC. 
Keywords: conventions, economics of conventions, neo-institutionalism, North. 
 
“Pragmatically, conventions are […] prior to institutions. We do not need to 
marshal the whole institutional arsenal to buy bread at the bakery. Similarly, 
to know what we have to do at a given moment in our job, we do not have to 
consult a whole battery of regulations and laws defining the job and its specif-
ic tasks before taking action” (Salais 2011, 223). 
1.  Introduction1 
In France, the socio-economic approach of the “économie des conventions” 
(economics of convention, in short EC) was invented in the 1980ies and devel-
oped in the following time by a growing number of researchers (Salais and 
Thévenot 1986; Salais and Storper 1993; Storper and Salais 1997; Favereau 
and Lazega 2002; Orléan 2004; Eymard-Duvernay 2006a, 2006b). EC can be 
conceived as a new pragmatic institutionalism. In EC, the difference between 
the concept of conventions and the concept of institutions, as well as their 
                                                             
∗  Rainer Diaz-Bone, Soziologisches Seminar, Universität Luzern, Frohburgstrasse 3, Postfach 
4466, 6002 Luzern, Switzerland; rainer.diazbone@unilu.ch. 
1  The arguments in this contribution are based on the preparation for the monograph on the 
économie des conventions (Diaz-Bone forthcoming) and on the work done with Robert 
Salais (Diaz-Bone and Salais 2011) and Laurent Thévenot (Diaz-Bone and Thévenot 2010). 
The author is thankful for critical comments given by Sigrid Quack (as given comment at 
the workshop “Conventions and institutions from a historical perspective”, see also the in-
troduction to this HSR Focus) and Christian Bessy (this HSR Focus). 
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interrelationship are part of the pragmatic foundation of its institutional theory. 
Ordinary understandings of institution normally subsume “convention” under 
the notion of “institution”. But insisting on the difference – as EC does – opens 
up a relational space between two distinct phenomena.  
The renaissance of institutionalisms in economic and social sciences cor-
rected the deficiencies of atomistic explanations in neo-classical theory. Nowa-
days, different neo-institutionalist approaches are established in the social 
sciences. But as side effects of this success, there is a plurality of concepts and 
their notions of “institution” vary in meaning, precision and in scope. This 
article will present the notion of institution from the standpoint of EC, claiming 
that it is important to denote and to elaborate what institutions are, what institu-
tions are not (!). This article tries to sketch the relations between institutions 
and conventions in the final part. 
2.  Problems of Contemporary Institutionalist’s Notions of 
 Institution 
As Laurent Thévenot noted, since its beginnings, sociology has used (Thévenot 
2007, 2011) a cognitivist foundation for the interpretation of institutions. Refer-
ring to Emile Durkheim, one can say that sociology was introduced as the 
social science of institutions and Durkheim identified the collective conscious-
ness and the collective pre-consciousness as the realms of institution (Durk-
heim 1950, 1982). Since then, Neo-Durkheimians like Mary Douglas (1986) or 
Pierre Bourdieu (1979, 1984) have argued that cognitive structures (as social 
classifications) act as institutions. Different notions of institutions have had 
their careers in social sciences. During the 20th century, the influence of insti-
tutionalisms decreased for some decades, but new institutionalist movements 
have (re)emerged since the 1980ies. Amongst the latter, the so called economic 
neo-institutionalism and the sociological neo-institutionalism gained the most 
international recognition.2  
2.1  Economic Neo-Institutionalism 
In 1937, Ronald Coase posed the famous question “Why do firms exist?” 
(Coase 1937). The highly influential answer is that firms (economic organiza-
tions) are one solution to tackle transaction costs in cases of transaction costs 
impeding the pure market as ideal institutional arrangement. Oliver Williamson 
(1985) elaborated this argumentation into a – seemingly – all embracing theory 
                                                             
2  In the case of Germany the sociological neo-institutionalism dominates especially in the 
field of new economic sociology and organizational analysis over “German” traditions. 
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(for the evaluation) of the best institutional arrangements for different products. 
Its evaluation consists in its performance in controlling and reducing transac-
tion costs. As demonstrated in the introduction to special issue “Conventions 
and institutions from a historical perspective” of Historical Social Research 
36.4 (Diaz-Bone and Salais 2011), the most advanced version of this tradition 
was developed by Douglass North (1990, 1994, 2005). 
This approach has undeniable advantages like a clear distinction between its 
concept of institution and other concepts – thereby opening explanatory capa-
bilities arising from the different possible relations, between culture, institu-
tions and actions in the course of history and in different economies.  
However, in the perspective of EC, important problems persisted. Economic 
neo-institutionalism reduced its understanding of economy to an extension of 
the market model to all others areas – including organizations and contracts.3 
Organizations are seen by Coase and Williamson as corrections for market 
failure: in their view, organizations are better institutional settings to control 
economic exchanges and to generate economic development under condition of 
raising transaction costs. Societal progress on the other hand is understood as 
the inventing of institutions reducing transaction costs. Thus, this institutional-
ism reduces the plurality of possible economic logics to one single one and its 
idea of societal progress is normative in character – progress as aiming for 
economic efficiency.4 This explanatory strategy is too simplifying. 
The mainstream of this economic neo-institutionalism5 focused its analyses 
on economic institutions while the role of culture was downplayed, regarding 
culture only as broad context for institutions (Williamson 2000). Studies by 
Douglass North included culture and cognition into this approach.6 North (and 
co-workers) included concepts like “shared mental models”, “shared beliefs” 
and “distributed cognition” (North 1994, 2005; Denzau and North 1994; 
Knight and North 1997). In contrast to Oliver Williamson – who regards firms, 
organizations and relational contraction as most important institution  
(Williamson 1985, 15) –, Douglass North does not regard organizations as 
institutions. In North’s view institutions are “the rules of the game” and organi-
zations are the “players” (North 1990). In “Understanding the process of eco-
nomic chance” Douglass North (2005) has presented an almost all-embracing 
theory, including genetics, language, human history. But the realization of 
empirical research of the relation of culture/cognition and institutions remains 
opaque. And there is another critical aspect: Douglass detaches institutions 
                                                             
3  See Eymard-Duvernay (1989, 2004) and Thévenot (1989). 
4  The model of North is not teleological, i.e. implying a form of economic change (“develop-
ment”) towards more efficient economies (North 2005, 61). 
5  This mainstream can be identified with “transactions cost economics” (Williamson 1985). 
6  In the field of economic history the approach developed by Douglass North is also known as 
new historical institutionalism (NHI). 
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from culture/cognition by distributing them to different realms (North 2005, 
chap. 5). Also this style of analysis keeps focusing the role of institutions as 
rules and as devices to control transaction costs and to enhance economic effi-
ciency.7 Economic neo-institutionalism regards institutions still as external 
constraints for economic action (Salais 1998; Bessy 2002a, 2011; Bessy and 
Favereau 2003). Institutions are conceptualized as external in the sense of 
given facts for economic action and coordination, thereby detaching institutions 
as rules from its usage (i.e. interpretive practices) and overlooking the incom-
pleteness of rules and norms (Favereau 1989). Instead, EC analyses the prag-
matic reality and relevance of culture and cognition (i.e. conventions) in real 
situations where actors have to cooperate/collaborate (Salais and Storper 1993; 
Storper and Salais 1997).8 This institutionalism assigns culture and institutions 
to the external environment of the process of action and coordination. Thus, the 
far reaching model for understanding the process of economic change does not 
prepare the analyses of the process of economic change, because it lacks the 
methodology for the detailed empirical research of real economic situations. 
The majority of economic paradigms suffer from positivism. In the case of 
economic neo-institutionalism, asset specificities and the value of products are 
given properties (Williamson 1985). This is a positivist assumption. Optimal 
institutional arrangements for production and coordination then have to follow 
the requirement of these properties. EC turns it the other way round. Instead of 
claiming pre-given entities and pre-given qualities, EC analyses empirically 
how in specific situations, actors deal with institutions, objects and interpreta-
tions in a way which collectively constructs properties and qualities of econom-
ic products. In this view, asset specifities emerge as result of convention-based 
collaboration/cooperation with institutional arrangements. In sum, EC criticizes 
economic neo-institutionalism for lacking constructivist sensitivity. 
The work of Douglass North developed economic neo-institutionalism in a 
fascinating way, broadening the understanding of what economic history is 
about (Diaz-Bone and Salais 2011).9 But the problems mentioned above in fact 
weaken its explanatory power. In its empirical historical research, the relation 
of culture/cognition and institutions/action is analyzed ex post and at the macro 
level – thereby failing to grasp the specific processes as well as the complexity 
of the relations between institutions and culture/cognition.  
                                                             
7  Coase analyzed economic law in its role for antirust policies. But again the focus was on 
economic institutions – here economic organizations and markets (Coase 1960). 
8  See for the methodological standpoint of EC Diaz-Bone (2011). 
9  The discussion here fails to present the advancements of North’s work; see Diaz-Bone and 
Salais (2011). For shared positions and convergence see Bessy (2002b) and Dequech (2005). 
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2.2  Sociological Neo-Institutionalism 
In 1977 and 1983, two seminal papers initiated the successful establishment of 
sociological neo-institutionalism (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983).10 Headed by John Meyer and Paul DiMaggio, sociological neo-
institutionalists connected analysis of economics with analysis of culture. 
Economies and economic institutions were seen as rooting in cultural and cog-
nitive practices and structures (DiMaggio 1994, 1997).11 This approach can be 
conceived as a neo-Weberian approach claiming unifying tendencies of ration-
alization in the different economic fields (Diaz-Bone 2012). The authors of 
sociological neo-institutionalism identified mechanisms as isomorphic process-
es, which contribute to the unification of organizational structures in markets 
and branches (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Furthermore, Meyer and Rowan 
argued that claims for “efficiency” and “economic rationality” are part of legit-
imatory discourses (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Thus, this strand of institutional-
ism is positioned in opposition to economics and economic neo-institution-
alism. Moreover, it gained remarkable merits in pointing at the societal and 
cultural foundations of economies where it shared some positions with EC 
(Diaz-Bone 2012).  
But from EC’s point of view – and similar/parallel to the case of economic 
neo-institutionalism – important problems remain.  
Sociological neo-institutionalism focused mainly on organizations as institu-
tions, leaving markets undertheorized. Rather, the notion of “field” is used to 
model the structure of a market or branch (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). How-
ever, fields are not as systematically constructed in analysis as in the research 
tradition of Pierre Bourdieu.12  
In this strand of neo-institutionalism, the notion of “institution” loses its dis-
tinguishing power since almost every pattern or structure is labeled “institu-
tion”. The difference between culture, norms, values, and institution almost 
vanished. The former strength of this approach – to integrate culture into the 
analysis – started to become one of its main deficiencies with institutions turn-
ing into “culture”.  
This form of institutionalism remains mainly a kind of macro-analytic insti-
tutionalism. In other words: the methodological standpoint of sociological neo-
institutionalism consists of holism unable to theorize situational constellations. 
Agency is understood as the performance of actors which are “equipped” and 
“engaged” through culture (Meyer 2009). But this is not only a theoretical 
problem but also a methodological one. Still today, there exists no coherent 
                                                             
10  See for a German introduction Hasse and Krücken (2005). 
11  Together with EC, the works of Harrison White and Mark Granovetter, the sociological neo-
institutionalism is part of the new economic sociology (Diaz-Bone 2012).  
12  Cf. Diaz-Bone (2012). 
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methodology of neo-institutional analysis which would be necessary in order to 
analyze not only the “macro-level” but also the micro-processes converging 
into stable coalitions of objects, ways to act, and ways to evaluate.  
Thus, several problems can be identified and the problems mentioned weak-
en the explanatory power of this approach. In its empirical sociological re-
search, the relation between culture/cognition and institutions/action is ex-
plained at the macro level and this institutionalism fails to deliver a compatible 
methodology.13 The precision of the notion of “institution” is eroded and the 
difference between culture and institutions is “short circuited”. One has to ask 
“what is not an institution?”  
Some of the problems of economic neo-institutionalism and sociological 
neo-institutionalism show similarities. Furthermore, both forms of institutional-
ism share a methodological lack to relate macro level theory to empirical inves-
tigation of micro analysis (situational analysis of coordinating practices). Also, 
both forms of neo-institutionalism share a way of thinking about institutional 
forms which overrides the coexisting plurality of coordination logics in empiri-
cal situations.14 Yet, the two institutionalisms locate the assumed unifying 
tendency (institutional logics) at different levels. In economic neo-institution-
alism, all institutional arrangements are compared to the neoclassical model of 
markets. This model constitutes the implicit reference and evaluation bench-
mark. Here, the unifying tendency is located in the way of evaluating. In socio-
logical neo-institutionalism, there is a variety of possible institutional arrange-
ments but in markets and in branches, a unifying tendency is postulated as an 
empirical process: organizations are oriented to each other seeking to adopt the 
most legitimate institutional form from other organizations.  
3.  Relating Institutions and Conventions 
From the standpoint of EC, the analysis of successful economic coordination is 
not completed by stating the existence of institutions or by pointing at the 
“functioning” of institutions. Instead, institutions have to be delimited and their 
situational recognition and interpretation is subjected to analyses constituting 
the point of departure for empirical explanations. Institutions as organizations 
or rules (contracts) are not regarded as agents or acting entities but as disposi-
                                                             
13  See for this critique Knoll (2012). 
14  But there are alternative developments in sociological neo-institutionalism as the approach 
of different “institutional logics”. An institutional logic consists out of practices, objects and 
values, and cognitive structures by which actors and organizations construct (and share) 
meaning to the processes of organizational activities (Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury 
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tives15 for actors in situations requiring coordination.16 Bessy and Favereau 
(2003) regard money, language and law as important economic institutions. 
Because the use and the functioning of institutions are not determined – institu-
tions and rules are conceived as incomplete by EC – conventions are required 
for pragmatic handling of institutions in given situations. For EC, the way of 
interpreting and usage of institutions depend on conventions, which actors 
apply situationally. Therefore, the difference of institutions and conventions is 
essential in EC to develop explanatory capabilities.  
In the following, a proposal for such a development of the explanatory ca-
pabilities will be sketched out (and it still has to be critically discussed, applied, 
adjusted and thereby tested). 
North subsumes conventions under the category of informal institutions 
(North 1990). This is only possible if conventions are reduced to something 
like customs, traditions or informal standards (and in this way misunderstood). 
In EC, conventions constitute culturally established resources for the coordina-
tion applied by actors in order to interpret situations and to evaluate persons, 
objects, processes to achieve a common goal (Salais and Storper 1993; Storper 
and Salais 1997). Socio-economic analysis has to explain why institutions do 
“work” (in specific situations) or do “not work” (in other situations) for such a 
collective intentionality. And this judgement is part of the evaluation done by 
competent actors who can exert critique about the functioning of an institution. 
Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot developed this sociological pragmatism of 
critique and justification in their theory of value (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991, 
2006). Distinguishing between institutions and conventions opens up a space 
for different possible relations between institutions and conventions. These 
relations can be classified if convention and institution do conform to each 
other or appear to be incoherent. There can be many reasons for coherent rela-
tions like the co-evolution of conventions and institutions. An example is the 
co-evolution of enterprises as family businesses and the domestic convention.17 
There are also many reasons possible for incoherent relations. Examples are 
economic institutions, governments designed for a certain purpose and a specif-
ic intentionality, which are applied by enterprises in a countervailing way, 
undermining the government’s aims and leading to the opposite outcome. Un-
employment insurance was designed to secure employees against risks of un-
                                                             
15  In the French social sciences and humanities concepts of dispositive (dispositif) are estab-
lished and widely used. A dispositive is a device or a tool that can be used by actors for stra-
tegic purposes. For an application in EC see Thévenot (1989, 149). 
16  This is an important difference to the institutionalist theory of North (1990) who regards 
also organizations as actors. But EC and North have in common differentiating institutions 
from other cultural resources and cognitive structures. This is an important difference to 
Neodurkheimian theories of institutions. 
17  Early enterprises were family based and located in family homes and then became ateliers as 
Thuderoz (2005) has noted. 
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employment and to keep them employable but it can be misused by enterprises 
dismissing employees in times of insufficient levels of production and re-
employing them again when more orders are coming in (cf. Salais 2007 for this 
example). This situation is unacceptable for the government and the public. In 
general, incoherent relations should be expected to be unstable. 
If these relations (categorized into two categories) are used in judgments of 
the functioning of institutions (also categorized into two categories), then four 
possible situations can be distinguished in a table.18 
Table 1: Four Perceived Situations  
relation of institution and 
convention(s) is: 
functioning of institution 
is judged as: 
“uncritical” “critical” 
coherent (1) normality / reliability 
(2) 
blockage / hegemony 
incoherent (3) dynamic / change 
(4) 
crisis / failure 
 
Situation (1): The first situation can be characterized as an uncontested “nor-
mality”. Actors judge the functioning of institutions as uncritical and the way 
institutions are pragmatically handled does not cause problems because prac-
tices are matching with institutions. Institutions “do work” (for the purposes 
actors pursue) and there is no reason for changing them. The interrelation be-
tween convention(s) and institution is perceived as mutually stabilizing. Corre-
spondingly, there is a cognitive coherent link between institution and judgment. 
Objects, people and institutions are made to “hold together”.19 
Situation (2): The first situation immediately changes into the second when 
actors judge the functioning of institutions as critical. Actors know how to 
appropriately handle the institution and how to use it for coordination, but they 
experience both as not matching with their collective interest. Then critique 
will be mobilized because actors perceive the coherent relation of conven-
tion(s) and institution as a problem. In this situation, it is not easy to criticize 
the institution because it is “backed up” by (at least) one convention. The situa-
tion is perceived as “blocked”, actors can perceive themselves as “dominated” 
by this coherent “coalition” of convention(s) and institution. All in all, this 
situation is most uncomfortable for actors because the whole situation is not 
easy to change and they have to develop a new couple of convention(s) and 
institution. 
                                                             
18  Laurent Thévenot has also used (a similar) table to analyze situations were actor meet using 
different conventions (Thévenot 1989, 150).  
19  Alain Desrosières (1990) has worked out the details of this perspective for the field of social 
statistics. 
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Situation (3): The next situation is different from the first and the second 
one since convention(s) and institution are not related in a coherent way. But 
this can be the consequence of new strategies of actors exchanging conventions 
in relation to institutions so that new opportunities, outcomes and value may be 
produced/may emerge. Therefore, actors do not criticize this incoherence but 
see the opportunity of the situation. In this case, the incoherence can be the 
result of a divergent evolution of the relation of convention and institution or it 
can be the result of a “revolutionary” strategy, which exchanged convention(s) 
or institution(s). This situation will cause further future change until it converg-
es again into a (more) coherent relation. 
Situation (4): The fourth situation is seen as a problem and now the critique 
of the malfunctioning of the institution has more impact because of the inco-
herence between convention(s) and institution. From the actors’ point of view, 
the institution has failed and this is not to justify. Now, cognition turns into the 
recognition of a real crisis of the institution.  
Situation (3) and (4) can be conceived as transitory and unstable situations, 
both tend to transform into the first situation. Situation (2) has more inertia in 
societies, organizations or fields with different social groups opposing each 
other or the elite (managers, leaders, politicians) failing to design (“reform”) 
the institution. 
The attention in empirical studies done in the field of institutionalism has 
mainly focused on situations like (4) and (3) and to a smaller extent on situa-
tion (2). Conventionally, situation (1) and the transitions between the four 
different forms of situations are not analyzed. 
The explanatory capability of EC could be developed by reconstructing in-
stitutional dynamics as a set of transitions (between the four sketched situa-
tions) thereby analyzing the upcoming tensions as well as the strategies of 
(de)stabilizing the coherence of the relation between convention(s) and institu-
tion which drive the transitions and therefore institutional dynamics.  
But real situations tend to be more complex. The first reason for this con-
sists in the plurality of conventions and sets of different objects involved in real 
situations. Empirically, the plurality of conventions can take different forms. 
No convention manifests itself in pure form, rather, they constitute ideal types 
present to everyday actors in everyday situations and not only scientific models 
(Diaz-Bone 2011). Stabilized forms of coordination rely on compromises of 
conventions. Another complexity is caused by the interrelation of different 
levels.20 On the personal level Laurent Thévenot (2006, 2007) has identified 
different forms of engagement and Robert Salais (2007) has analyzed the state 
as convention. The consequence is a multi-level model focusing on actors in 
specific situations. 
                                                             
20  See also Diaz-Bone and Thévenot (2010), Diaz-Bone (2009). 
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